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Abstract
We describe our experiences in deploying a
campus-wide wireless security testbed. The testbed
gives us the capability to monitor security-related as-
pects of the 802.11 MAC layer in over 200 diverse
campus locations. We describe both the technical
and the social challenges of designing, building, and
deploying such a system, which, to the best of our
knowledge, is the largest such testbed in academia
(with the UCSD’s Jigsaw infrastructure a close com-
petitor). In this paper we focus on the testbed setup,
rather than on the experimental data and results.
1 Introduction
The Dartmouth Internet Security Testbed (DIST)1
wireless infrastructure is a collection of 802.11 MAC
layer monitors, servers, and software, which oper-
ates with support from Dartmouth’s Peter Kiewit
Computing Services (PKCS), the College’s central
IT organization. DIST wireless software and opera-
tional procedures ensure that the data collection ex-
periments are well-documented with detailed audit
traces, and the gathered data remains confidential.
Unlike simulated network testbeds, DIST wireless
infrastructure is distributed across diverse locations
throughout the production wireless network. Thus it
also allows researchers to assist PKCS in diagnosing
network conditions.
1This paper results from a research program in the Insti-
tute for Security, Technology, and Society (ISTS), supported
by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security under Grant
Award Number 2006-CS-001-000001. The views and conclu-
sions contained in this document are those of the authors and
should not be interpreted as necessarily representing the official
policies, either expressed or implied, of the U.S. Department
of Homeland Security.
Since DIST is a production infrastructure, the de-
sign and use policies of DIST wireless were affected by
many social, technical, and legal considerations and
concerns. In this paper, we share our experiences of
designing, building, and deploying the DIST wireless
infrastructure.
2 Why production networks?
Access to real-world network traffic is crucial for
many security and privacy research problems.
Network Intrusion Detection. Anomaly-based
intrusion detection requires establishing the concept
of the network’s “normal” traffic, or even validating
whether such a concept can be meaningfully defined
(cf. [6, 7]). Even though this concept is not central
to rule-based systems, in practice their accuracy2 can
only be evaluated on realistic test data.
Traffic variability & network performance. Un-
derstaning variations of “normal” network traffic goes
beyond intrusion detection. Depending on the net-
work’s topology and components, certain hard-to-
detect traffic patterns may cause significant degrada-
tion in the quality of service while consuming much
smaller bandwidth than the network is designed to
handle. Such patterns may even be artificially crafted
(e.g., [12, 8] for 802.11, TCP). Not surprisingly, de-
scribing real traffic variability has attracted practi-
tioners’ and researchers’ attention [2, 13].
Research Data Sanitization & User Privacy.
Whereas real data is highly desirable for researchers,
its use comes at the (very high) price of ensuring that
2More precisely, the level of costly false alarms, which can
make a theoretically attractive system entirely unusable in pro-
duction environments.
1
it is purged of associations with the actual persons
using the network. We must make it difficult for a
malicious entity to discover their identities or to cause
them harm. Previous miscalculations, such as the
unfortunate example of the “AOL data set”, and the
increasing public consciousness of the capabilities of
adversarial data mining create an atmosphere of legal
uncertainty about researcher access to real data [15].
Unfortunately, sanitization of real network data is
in itself a hard research problem [11, for example]. A
testbed that gives researchers access to real network
traffic is a powerful means of studying this problem.
3 Architecture & operation
DIST wireless, in development since January 2006,
consists of 210 Wi-Fi access points in 10 large build-
ings across campus, of the same brand and model
that Dartmouth uses to provide its production Wi-
Fi network service on campus. We leveraged our
existing scalable network-monitoring and intrusion-
detection software base (from our MAP project [14]),
in which we re-flashed the Aruba AP70 access points
with OpenWRT Linux and ran our own software for
sniffing on the Wi-Fi network interface. This software
uses the pcap library to capture Wi-Fi frames and
packs multiple frames into a custom format for trans-
mission to our central server for real-time analysis
and (optionally) storage. We added in-line trace san-
itization, including anonymization, and never store
un-sanitized data.
The DIST wireless infrastructure consists of snif-
fers we call Air Monitors (AMs) distributed across
the campus and of DIST servers, which process
frames captured by the AMs and may store sani-
tized frames to disk. The AMs send data to, and
receive configuration files and command scripts from,
the servers.
We designate one of the DIST servers as the
launchpad. The launchpad is the only host that may
launch experiments using the AMs. This policy is
enforced by the AMs’ firewall scripts and allows us
to tightly limit the allowed communications between
the DIST hosts.
We configure and run each experiment through the
MAPmaker scripting system on the launchpad. Con-
figuration files describe the experiment (in particular,
the kind of 802.11 frames to capture, which AMs and
servers to use, and which frame-processing programs
to run). MAPmaker initiates processes on the DIST
servers and AMs and defines communication channels
among these processes.
As a part of our self-imposed discipline, we require
that all uses of the DIST system are thoroughly docu-
mented and leave an audit trail. Consequently, MAP-
maker logs an extensive amount of information about
an experiment, including: (a) source control version
stamps of MAPmaker, (b) source control stamps and
checksums of executables launched by MAPmaker,
(c) raw and expanded MAPmaker parameter values
for each MAPmaker process, (d) copies of process
configuration files, (e) ssh commands issued to DIST
servers or AMs, (f) output (stderr and stdout) and
exit codes of all ssh commands, and (g) output of all
MAPmaker processes.
4 Harsh realities
Installing, connecting, and managing over 200 AMs
in 10 large campus buildings proved to be a significant
challenge in many ways. We hope that our enumera-
tion will be helpful to others who wish to deploy such
a system.
IT services permission. This step was easy, be-
cause we had developed the concept in collaboration
with our Network Services group. We are fortunate
to have a group of talented professionals who are also
enthusiastic collaborators with researchers. We have
repeatedly heard from colleagues, however, that this
hurdle is very difficult in their organizations.
IRB approval. All universities with US research
funding are required to operate an Institutional Re-
view Board (IRB), so that research involving human
subjects can be evaluated to ensure that risks are ac-
ceptable, and that subjects provide informed consent
where possible. We obtained formal permission from
the Dartmouth’s IRB, the Committee for Protection
of Human Subjects (CPHS).
IRB interaction can be a challenge for computer
security researchers, since IRBs primarily operate in
terms of medical research and often lack the concep-
tual structure for evaluating computer and network-
specific risks [5]. Our approach in earlier CPHS appli-
cations has been to thoroughly document the terms
and concerns of computer security and user privacy
to provide such a structure. In the case of DIST,
our prior Wi-Fi network tracing effort was approved
by CPHS several years ago, and since our proposed
effort was a subset of what we had done earlier, a
simple renewal was sufficient.
Aesthetics. We then had to address the aesthetic
concerns of the building owners (department heads,
building managers, and staff with responsibilities for
building upkeep) regarding the appearance of the
AMs, necessary wiring, and the signs explaining the
AMs’ nature and purpose. These concerns included
wires or wire-mold running to the AMs along walls,
as well as drilling holes to place the AMs. These
concerns proved to be non-trivial to address and ne-
cessitated compromises in the placement of AMs.
Our deployment spans the main library complex,
the school of engineering, the school of business, a
gymnasium, a student center, several dormitories,
and several academic buildings.
In some cases, we chose sites where renovation was
underway, and our monitors (and their wiring) could
be easily installed during the construction process,
requiring less cost and no inconvenience to the build-
ing residents. In all cases, we met personally with
the lead staff of each department, describing what
we planned to do. We walked through their build-
ings, sometimes repeatedly, discussing in detail the
placement of AMs and their wiring.
Each building required several months of planning
to obtain permission, choose sites, confirm the sites
with department staff, obtain quotes from electri-
cians, install the wiring, and install the AMs. In sev-
eral cases, proposed locations had to be changed, due
to availability of power (e.g., PoE-capable network
ports being already occupied by other devices), office
occupants’ objections, or projected costs of electrical
work. A major factor of success was access to detailed
building floor plans, to which we added DIST-related
annotations, and which we kept under source control.
Signage. As a part of our approval process, we com-
mitted to providing explanatory signs for the build-
ings where we deployed our AMs. The signs ex-
plained the function of the AMs and provided a URL
for further information. The text, placement, and
appearance of these signs turned out to be an im-
portant concern for the building owner, and required
multiple personal consultations.
External audit. Due to the scale of the DIST ef-
fort and the sensitive issues related to the privacy of
network users, we met with several leadership groups
on campus to explain our plans, answer their ques-
tions, obtain their feedback, and ultimately seek offi-
cial approval from the College to proceed with trace
collection. In particular, we met with the high-level
faculty committee responsible for sponsored research
and the provost-level council that includes all campus
deans. In both cases we obtained valuable feedback.
The College hired an outside expert, a researcher
with several years of network-tracing experience in
academic settings, to visit campus, interview the re-
search teams, and to study our trace-collection infras-
tructure in detail. This visit served as a tremendous
help to us, providing a critical eye to help us recog-
nize where our plans could be improved or become
more specific.
In response to the auditor’s feedback, we added
additional layers of security to ensure that the infras-
tructure itself cannot be compromised by attackers
and to preserve confidentiality of stored data, such
as hardening the DIST hosts to a very small num-
ber of network services, restrictive firewall configura-
tions, no crypto keys in persistent storage, periodic
AM restarts and firmware checks, and frequent de-
fensive port-scans.
We also developed an extensive 20-page internal
document on our design principles and procedures,
which included guidelines for future changes to the
infrastructure.
5 Surviving network changes
To an extensive testbed that relies on and instru-
ments a production network environment, substan-
tial configuration changes in this production network
are something of a “net-quake” in which the under-
lying environment is “shifting” under it. Yet, such
changes are almost certain to happen within a few
years, as production networks respond to the changes
in both the organization’s mission and the Internet
itself. These changes are even more likely to hap-
pen in campus networks than in industry networks,
because college students and faculty are likely to be
early adopters of new network protocols and appli-
cations, some of which are unfortunate distractions,
whereas others quickly become indispensable.
A testbed overlayed on top of a production network
must be designed with enough flexibility to recover
from “net-quakes”, both planned and unplanned. In
particular, we realized (too late) the importance of
maintaining a fallback control channel to the AMs
during an unannounced subnet migration in one of
our DIST-covered buildings.
Thus, even though we configure AMs’ firmware
with static IP addresses and maintain those in source-
controlled tables on the launchpad server (together
with other configuration information), we are also
considering a fallback configuration method, based
on AMs obtaining a DHCP address and reporting it
to a logging port on the launchpad via a UDP mes-
sage, so that a management ssh connection could be
made to it from the launchpad.
We believe that network recovery, despite its prac-
tical importance for administrators and architects,
has not been given proper researcher attention, and
direct the reader to the discussion in [10].
6 Data protection and sanitization
We discard all but the MAC layer from each frame,
then encrypt each packet of captured frames before
sending them to the server; at the server they are
decrypted and immediately anonymized before being
used for inline analysis or storage for offline analysis.
The anonymization map is generated anew for each
experiment, using a random seed, which is discarded
after use. Thus very little sensitive information is
captured, and the most sensitive components (MAC
addresses and SSIDs) are thoroughly anonymized.
The external auditor expressed concern about
the DIST’s initially proposed fast but home-grown
MAC sanitization and suggested using some well-
understood standard cryptographic solution instead.
The computation power of our AP70 Air Monitors
being already stretched by other tasks, we decided
on performing sanitization on DIST servers. In order
to preserve the confidentiality of data captured by
the AMs in transit to servers, these data must be
encrypted by a cipher.
6.1 In search of a better cipher
Based on the mode of operation, ciphers are sub-
divided into two kinds: block ciphers and stream ci-
phers. A block cipher operates on data blocks, usu-
ally of fixed size, and a stream cipher operates on a
continuous stream of data. We chose a stream cipher
over a block cipher because of two considerations:
speed and security. With regards to speed, a stream
cipher generally could be much faster than a block
cipher. As to security, when using the same encryp-
tion key, there is a strict one-to-one mapping between
the plaintext and the ciphertext for a block cipher,
whereas there is no such one-to-one mapping for a
stream cipher [9]. For DIST, this property of block
ciphers could be a potential security flaw, because all
possible values in many fields of Radiotap header and
IEEE 802.11 header can be easily enumerated, and
thus a block cipher may facilitate attacks by provid-
ing a much smaller search space than a stream cipher.
We evaluated all stream ciphers from the eS-
TREAM project [4] and the SNOW2 cipher [3]. Our
top 2 final winners are Rabbit and SNOW2. It is
worth mentioning that the implementation of Rabbit
cipher evaluated here is in assembly language and op-
timized for MIPS 4Kc processor, whereas the imple-
mentation of SNOW2 is written in C language and
not specifically optimized for this processor. Since
our goal was to transmit the protected data most
efficiently, we tried the ciphers both without com-
pression and in combination with compression. We
observed the following:
1. For stream ciphers, Rabbit emerges as a win-
ner on AP70s. superseding SNOW2. For executing
5000 loops, Rabbit takes 5.33–5.55 seconds, whereas
SNOW2 takes 7.42–7.73 seconds.3
3The simpler Rabbit cipher is implemented in assembly lan-
guage and optimized for MIPS 4Kc processor, whereas the im-
plementation of SNOW2 was in C.
2. A more interesting observation is that, if encryp-
tion and UDP forwarding are included, adding in
an efficient compression not only greatly saves net-
work bandwidth, but also decreases the net process-
ing time.
Securely transmitting 5000 14K jumbo frames
(each jumbo frame may contain tens to hundreds
of captured Radiotap and IEEE 802.11 headers) to
a DIST server took 6.2–6.4 seconds, which encom-
passed two operations: encryption and UDP forward-
ing. The Ethernet bandwidth used is 14K bytes per
frame. However, if we compress these jumbo frames
first, handling them takes less time, namely 5.3–
5.4 seconds for three operations: compression + en-
cryption + UDP forwarding. The required Ethernet
bandwidth is also reduced by nearly 80% (from 14K
per frame to just 3K per frame). This observation
illustrates that an efficient compression can not only
save the bandwidth, but also saves a lot of time for
the operations of encryption and UDP forwarding.
6.2 MAC address and SSID sanitization
Depending on the particular clients’ setup, MAC
addresses of 802.11 wireless client stations may en-
able personal identification of the stations’ owners.
Although MAC addresses by themselves do not con-
stitute personally identifiable information, they can
be correlated by third parties with other data, such
as DHCP dynamic DNS updates or Netreg logs. Al-
though the degree of efficiency with which such data
can be exploited to reveal the wireless station own-
ers’ identities is still being investigated, we take the
position that logging 802.11 wireless clients’ MAC ad-
dresses may be a privacy concern.
To address this concern, we mandate that the
802.11 client MAC addresses must be sanitized dur-
ing capture in DIST experiments. We conduct MAC
anonymization on the servers, as explained above,
and protect the MAC addresses in transit from AMs
with a separate encryption step. Processes running
on DIST servers are provided with a simple frame-
sanitization interface, which consists of a small set of
functions to sanitize MAC addresses of 802.11 wire-
less stations.
A randomly-generated sanitization key, akin to an
encryption key, seeds a stream of pseudo-random
numbers for the algorithm. This key is not reported
to users, is not written to stable storage, and only
resides in a single process for the minimal time neces-
sary. The stream of pseudo-random numbers is used
to construct a set of in-memory tables, which are con-
sulted as part of the sanitization task. The tables are
never written to stable storage.
Each set of tables is identified by a unique ID,
by which they can be located in RAM. This design
makes it possible for several concurrently running ex-
periments to use different and unrelated sanitization
tables. In particular, no MAC-related data collected
by one experiment can then be meaningfully corre-
lated or de-anonymized with the data collected by
another. As a matter of policy, MAC anonymization
tables are derived from a per-experiment key; the key
is never stored on disk, and is destroyed after the ta-
bles are generated; the tables are discarded after the
data-collection experiment is complete; the tables are
never written to disk.
A well-understoodchannel of potential private in-
formation disclosure is the 802.11 Probe Request
frame information element that contains the name of
the desired ESSID. Some 802.11 clients still attempt
to probe and then associate with the last known net-
work by ESSID, although this behavior has long been
revealed as a privacy risk. The probed ESSID often
contains private information, such as the home wire-
less network owner’s name. Transmitted in the clear,
the ESSID may reveal the identity of the client sta-
tion’s owner. The DIST server anonymization pro-
cess includes a special case for the probed ESSIDs. If
an ESSID is not a member of Dartmouth’s whitelist,
the corresponding information element is anonymized
by hashing its ASCII string value.
7 Related Work
Several projects at other academic institutions
targeted large-scale wireless network monitoring.
Whereas DIST remains, to the best of our knowledge,
the largest such infrastructure, we direct the reader
to the experiences of Yeo et al. [16], the UCSD’s Jig-
saw [1] and EPFL’s DOMINO [12].
8 Conclusion
Pervasive monitoring of a network infrastructure
presents a number of challenges that illustrate the
stark differences between clean, simple academic re-
search models and the real-life compromises needed
to set up and maintain such a monitoring infras-
tructure. Building DIST as a testbed that monitors
and relies on Dartmouth’s main production wireless
infrastructure presented us with many foreseen and
unforeseen social and technical challenges. We hope
that our experience will motivate others to build sim-
ilar testbeds and help them do so more efficiently.
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